June 2018 34 He is arguably the most controversial figure in American History. In the vast literature of American history, people, and events, it is only Abraham Lincoln and the Battle of Gettysburg who surpass him (and that one singular event that we have identified him with) in the written word. Love him or hate him, call him daring, heroic, brave, intelligent on one hand, or reckless, incredibly stupid, a mass murderer (which by the way he wasn't) and a fool on the other, the name George Armstrong Custer can spark three arguments amongst two people quite easily. But on the upcoming 142th anniversary of the Battle of the Little Big Horn the questions remain - who was George Armstrong Custer and was that "Terrible Glory" (according to one historian of the Little Big Horn battle) totally his fault, or was it a plan of well- conceived daring gone totally wrong because of two subordinates with serious drinking problems, one of whom was under a cloud prior to the battle, the other brave yet filled with jealousy and sheer hatred of his commanding officer? What is written here may clarify a few matters or muddy up the waters of the Little Big Horn River even more so, here goes... The basic facts are already well-known to the Custeriana buffs and those who are interested in both the Civil War and the Plains Indian Wars. He was last in his Class of 1861 at West Point. Custer fought in every major Civil War battle from First Bull Run to Appomattox. He was known as the "Boy General", the youngest Major General in the Union Army. What isn't so well-known is that he probably saved the Union even more so than the repulse of Pickett's Charge on Cemetery Ridge, July 3, 1863. It was Custer and about 3,000 Union Cavalrymen who stopped Jeb Stuart and over two times the number of Confederate cavalry dead in their tracks during Stuart's attempt to turn the right flank of the Union line 3 miles away from the main battle. Repulsed twice, trice undaunted, Custer rallied his Michigan Cavalry, shouting "C'mon You Wolverines!" charging headlong into Stuart's oncoming mass and turning them back just as Pickett's ill-fated charge commenced. Custer would also be the catalyst in Phil Sheridan's smashing victory over Jubal Early's Confederate Army of the Shenandoah at Cedar Creek in October 1864. It would also be Custer pursuing Lee after Richmond fell to a place called Appomattox just one week later. Another relatively unknown fact is that it would be Custer who would accept Lee's emissaries and their flag of truce at Appomattox Court House just prior to Lee's surrender. In the immediate aftermath of the surrender, Phil Sheridan himself purchased the little table where Lee signed the surrender terms and presented it to Custer's wife Libbie, noting that it was her husband who was in the forefront of sealing the deal, i.e., forcing Lee's capitulation. Remaining in the Army with the reduced rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Custer nevertheless remained Sheridan's favorite "go-to" General, and Custer didn't fail him until the Little Big Horn campaign. Chalking up notable victories against the Cheyenne in the surprise winter 1868 attack at the Washita (where Custer insisted on no harm be done to the captive Cheyenne women and children)) and against the Kiowa the following spring. Custer kept the Southern Plains relatively quiet for over five years until the Comanche-Cheyenne-Kiowa Red River War of 1874. Transferred north to the Dakotas, Custer subdued the Sioux during the Yellowstone Expedition the same year his contemporaries and rivals MacKenzie and Miles had their hands full in that aforementioned Red River War. Because of his successes in those battles and campaigns against the Plains Indians Custer had earned the reputation of being the nation's most foremost Indian fighter. So why did he fail so tragically at the Little Big Horn? Was it his own ego and rashness that sealed his own and the doom of a third of his command? On the surface, it would seem so but on closer examination and with more recent historical evidence unearthed one would have to be extremely careful and reckless to accept the notion of Custer being a vainglorious, ignorant fool. First off, Custer's plan was daring and bold in its conceptual form - a three-pronged attack on the Indian encampment, holding it and the dependents within until the Sioux and Cheyenne were forced either to retreat or to surrender. A retreat that, if the campaign itself had been on track, would have been quickly cut-off. This was a plan that had worked so well in its execution at the Washita, so there was already a history of success in the planning, implement, and execution of such a surprise assault. Secondly, General Terry and Colonel Gibbon were coming in from the west with the 2nd Cavalry and a force of Infantry, and also that General Crook coming up from the south with the 3rd Cavalry would seal off the Indian perimeter. Thirdly, Custer had assumed that his subordinates were capable men. Finally, Custer had faith in his 7th Cavalry, whom he had personally whipped into shape as arguably the best-mounted regiment (at the time) in the United States Army. BUT... AND YES, A BIG BUT... these assumptions would collapse largely due to outside factors that were for the most part completely out of Custer's hands. Let's start with the second assumption that General Terry with Gibbon in the Montana column, and Crook and his force would arrive on time. This assumption collapsed almost immediately. First, Terry found it slow going across the rugged landscape of Montana. Custer had decided to eschew taking on the Gatling guns Terry had offered him because they were bulky and unreliable when used on rough terrain, so Terry's wagons ended up transporting them and most of the 2nd and 7th Cavalry's supplies. Besides he knew that Custer's successes were mainly due to his moving fast and decisively. The 2nd, under the command of Colonel James S. "Grasshopper Jim" Brisbin, so overweight and stricken with gout that he was unable to mount his horse, dragged along in the miserable humid heat of a Montana late spring. Even so, Terry just might have been able to link up with Custer almost on time except that unbeknownst to both he and Custer, Crook had been pummeled by Crazy Horse on June 19th on the Rosebud, and while able to retain the field, he had decided to withdraw just south of the river for his command to recuperate. Crook did not even attempt to send any messengers off to Terry to let him know of his plight, even though in his immediate command he had at least two of the very best U.S. Cavalry scouts in Frank Gourard and "Big Bat" Pourier, both men who knew the territory, knew Indian ways and would have been able to cross through the hostiles undetected. This freed Crazy Horse and his mass force of warriors to link up with the camps of Sitting Bull and Gall. So the campaign was not on track. In fact, it was far from being so. Secondly, the historical record from the start has put paid the notion that Custer's subordinates were capable men - they were not. By Alan Rockman Custer Controversies on the 142nd Anniversary of the Little Big Horn continued on page 43