b'The History of the War of theAutumn of the Black SnakePART 2 By Alan RockmanBEWARE OF SURPRISE opposed to increasing a regular army, even one as poorly As calamitous as the Harmartreated as this one was. Furthermore, despite Washington\'s defeat was, Harmar achievedwarnings, his subordinates, especially St. Clair did not some of his objectives, includingunderstand the suddenness of Indian warfare. The need the destruction (by both thewas, as Washington himself said, to make sure the camps Indians and his men) of the Miamiwere fortified at night and to keep the guards vigilant as township, and he brought back the majority of his commandthe Indians had proven quite capable of blending into in order - and more importantly, alive. The next expeditionthe forests and the brush. St. Clair begin his preparations would not be so lucky. The disaster about to occur waswithout even ensuring that all was fully prepared to take probably the worst defeat of American arms up to the Littleon the Miami and the Shawnee, but again, the fault was as Big Horn, and thence to the disasters at Bataan and Kasserinemuch Washington\'s as his, for while Washington told him Pass in World War II. The clumsy, chequered instigator of theto beware of surprise, he also in almost the same breath horrendous defeat was another old favorite of Washington\'s,urged St. Clair to move quickly, that the nation needed to the former British officer turned American general, and nowresolve the Indian matter once and for all.governor of Ohio Territory, Arthur St. Clair.So an almost infirm St. Clair (he was stricken with First, Arthur St. Clair who was the very epitome of a formergout) left for Fort Washington in late March 1791. ByGeneral Richard ButlerBritish officer, fought alongside Wolfe in Quebec. The oncemid-summer, he had gotten almost nowhere, outside handsome and trim St. Clair settled in Pennsylvania afterof some construction of advance forts. Not only had he the French and Indian War, embracing the patriot causeencountered the remnants of a very dispirited regularto a grueling march of almost 90 miles, their lack of morale and fighting against his countrymen. Washington took aforce (Harmar\'s), but the 3,000 regular troops he had beenunder two quarreling commanders, the biting cold, and the liking to the former British officer, just four years youngeroriginally promised had been whittled down to about 2,000lack of food.than him, despite a war record that including abandoningas many of the prospective soldiers angered over lack of the vital Fort Ticonderoga without even firing a shot.pay bolted. He was told he would have to depend mostly onWorse, in the days before the massacre, St. Clair had failed (Due to his negligence St. Clair failed to fortify the heightsthe militia, the same militia who broke and ran when Littleto fortify his camps and had failed to post sentries well surrounding the vital fort, allowing the British to seize themTurtle ambushed them at Kekionga. The needed suppliesoutside his defensive perimeter, which was a clear violation and deploy cannon on the exposed fort below). A court- were delayed, the regulars still were not paid, and theof Washington\'s precautionary instructions. Warriors martial had been called, but St. Clair not only managedhit-or-miss militia of which so much was depended uponmoving through the forest had been seen by some of St. to avoid censure, but he also thrived, becoming the first(due to the lack of regulars) would not even arrive untilClair\'s men, and General Butler himself had been warned governor of the Northwest Territories after the passing ofSeptember, much too late for even rudimentary training.by an officer who had seen the movement of braves in war the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. With his mind focusedThe physically ill and confused St. Clair, bombardedpaint, but the veteran Indian fighter Butler did not act on on westward expansion and subjugating the warrior tribes,with calls for immediate action from Washington, whothe information. Thus the encampment was practically Washington, shortly after becoming president, met withhimself was quite unaware of the real situation on thewide open on the early morning hours of November 4, 1791 his old friend, a now older, flabby, ruddy-faced, Territorialfrontier or even the condition of the regulars, was dealing(Palmer, 1794, page 197). The Indians, on the other hand, Governor St. Clair. As General Palmer wrote: "Couldwith shortages of supplies, his militia not present forhad known of St. Clair\'s advance almost from the get-go, Washington have glimpsed the future he would have beenduty, on top his ignorance of Indian fighting and tactics.and in the forest, just around a bend of the Wabash just distressed to see in the fleshy face of his old colleague theThe decisions St. Clair would make would not just besouth of Miami Town were 1,000 warriors led by their chiefs source of some of his most bitter moments over the nextdetrimental to his force and go against almost every rule inand their Loyalist agents just awaiting the order to pounce.three years - a man who would carry the administration andthe book; they would also prove disastrous for himself and the country to war, and who would be responsible for thehis command. Third, breaking of the rules. Given Washington\'s clear-new nation\'s first military disaster" (Palmer, 1794, p. 150). cut orders to St. Clair to fortify his camps and beware of First, concerning the militia. St. Clair had been orderedsurprise, it is astonishing to note that St. Clair allowed over With Harmar\'s "flying strike" having dissolved into a rout,to proceed cautiously and beware of surprise, but when200 women and children to accompany his army as they Washington once again summoned St. Clair to Philadelphia,the unruly, virtually untrained militia finally did arrive,moved northwards to their date with doom. While many gave him command of what was now a quite dispiritedthey proved to be even more cautious than necessary, onlyof the women and children were the wives of the militia, army, and in doing so warned him about the dangersadvancing a few miles per day. St. Clair openly blamedthere were quite a few of the women who were, shall we of Indian warfare, of the need to be vigilant at all times:the commander of the militia who was also his second- say, "camp followers," who had come along providing "The old soldier, whose personal experiences with Indiansin-command, General Richard Butler. Butler, anotherjollification for the militiamen. The fact of the matter is that were painful to recall, told the new major general that hisRevolutionary War hero, was one of the few regular officersthese women and children, placed within the center part guidance could be wrapped up in three words: "beware ofwell-versed in Indian affairs, having traded and negotiatedof St. Clair\'s encampment, should never have been there in surprise." Elaborating pointedly he admonished his fieldwith the Shawnee (he was also rumored to have had athe first place as it was a clear violation of military rules and commander to "trust not the Indian; leave not your armsShawnee mistress) (Ibid., pp.193-194; Hogeland, Autumnregulations. Like the unsuspecting soldiers, the women and for the moment; and when you halt for the night be sure toof the Black Snake, pp.12-13). For his part, Butler becamechildren would pay dearly that bloody morning.fortify your camp - again and again, general, BEWARE OFopenly contemptuous of his commanding officer, which SURPRISE" (Palmer, 1794, PP. 186-187). might have been well and good if he had put his goodTHE ST. CLAIR MASSACREtalents to use in training and ensuring his militia were notIn the pre-dawn darkness of an Ohio winter morning, as the Trouble is, no one, not even Washington or Secretary ofonly on alert but ready to fight in case of Indian attack. Buttroops were being dismissed from roll call, over a thousand War Henry Knox, let alone St. Clair, had taken notice of thehe didn\'t and they weren\'t. braves struck St. Clair\'s camp from almost all sides. They needs of the battered army. The quartermaster of the Army,easily sliced their way through the militia, butchering scores a Knox crony, had minimized the needs of the Army. FoodSecondly, a decided lack of caution. The mixed force ofof them as they made for the main encampment itself. The and supplies were hard to come by in the remote frontiermilitia and regulars, originally 1,800, were ultimatelyconfused, frightened militiamen quickly gave way, leaving forts, and the regular soldiers were justifiably grumblingwhittled down to around 1,200 (figures vary, as do thethe scattered regulars, themselves caught by surprise, to over having not been paid in months. The old mindsetextent of casualties) due to disease, desertion, and the needtry to put together a semblance of defense as the Indians of the Revolution, soon-to-be proved to be a fallacy, thatto protect stores. They were quite cautious at the beginningrushed in from the forests. Smoke, death, the smell of blood, militia troops not only stopped British regulars in theirof the march, but by the beginning of November, just daysthe shout of desperate orders, and the horrific cries of the tracks but had won the war, was still prevalent. Washingtonbefore their ultimate decimation near the banks of thewomen and children filled the cold morning air along the and the politicians, especially those in Congress were stillWabash, the men became lazy, indifferent - much of it dueWabash. The only regulars who were not caught by surprise 44 December 2020'